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THE CONVENTION FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE
INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE (CSICH) AND THE
CONTROL OF INDIGENOUS CULTURE: A CRITICAL
COMMENT ON POWER AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
JONATHAN LILJEBLAD*
ABSTRACT
The Preamble of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of
the Intangible Cultural Heritage (CSICH) recognizes the connection
between indigenous peoples and intangible cultural heritage. The
convention indicates that part of its mission is to protect the intan-
gible cultural heritage of indigenous peoples against the processes
of globalization and social transformation. The convention, however,
has been critiqued for the manner in which it attempts to manage
intangible cultural heritage, with critics charging that the convention
fosters a power structure that favors states and thereby threatens to
marginalize indigenous peoples from control over their own cultures.
Such criticism raises a question as to what changes should be made
to rectify the power inequalities of the CSICH to aid indigenous peo-
ples. This Article responds to this question, and follows the conven-
tion’s critiques by using the theories of Michel Foucault to evaluate
the power structure created by the CSICH and identify what types
of changes to the convention would benefit indigenous peoples.
INTRODUCTION
I. THE CSICH AND ITS CRITIQUES
II. FRAMING THE CSICH WITHIN FOUCAULT




The preamble of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of
the Intangible Cultural Heritage (CSICH) recognizes the connection
between indigenous peoples and intangible cultural heritage.1 The
convention stresses “that communities, in particular indigenous
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1. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage pmbl.,
Oct. 17, 2003, 2368 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CSICH].
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communities . . . play an important role in the production, safeguard-
ing, maintenance and re-creation of the intangible culture heritage.”2
In doing so, the CSICH orients itself as an international legal instru-
ment intended to assist indigenous peoples in the preservation of
their respective cultures. As part of its mission, the CSICH seeks to
protect the intangible cultural heritage of indigenous peoples against
“the processes of globalization and social transformation.”3 The con-
vention identifies globalization as giving rise to the “deterioration,
disappearance and destruction of the intangible cultural heritage.”4
Ostensibly, the CSICH sees the protection of intangible cultural
heritage as having significance not for indigenous cultures alone but
also for the world as a whole, with its text noting that there is a
“universal will and [a] common concern to safeguard the intangible
cultural heritage of humanity.”5 The convention, however, has been
criticized for the manner in which it attempts to manage intangible
cultural heritage. In particular, with respect to indigenous peoples,
critics charge that the convention fosters a power structure that
favors states and thereby threatens to marginalize indigenous peoples
from control over their own cultures.6
Such criticism raises the issue of what changes, if any, should
be made to rectify the power inequalities of the CSICH to help indi-
genous peoples exercise control of their own respective cultures. The
analysis in the following sections seeks to address such a topic, and
addresses the convention’s critiques by appropriating the theories
of Michel Foucault to evaluate the power structure created by the
CSICH and identify what types of changes to the convention would
benefit indigenous peoples. The discussion begins with a brief sum-
mary of the CSICH and the critiques against it, proceeds with a
framing of the CSICH within Foucault’s theories, and then applies
Foucault to identify the dangers posed by the convention’s power
structure in regards to indigenous peoples, and from such insights,
recognizes the types of changes that are more favorable to indige-
nous control over their own intangible cultural heritage.
I. THE CSICH AND ITS CRITIQUES
The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural





6. Paul Kuruk, Cultural Heritage, Traditional Knowledge and Indigenous Rights:
An Analysis of the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, 1
MACQUARIE J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 111, 128 (2004); Federico Lenzerini, Intangible Cul-
tural Heritage: The Living Culture of Peoples, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 101, 111–12 (2011).
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Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
held in 2003.7 The convention seeks to recognize and protect intangi-
ble cultural heritage at local, national, and international levels.8 It
defines “intangible cultural heritage” as “practices, representations,
expressions, knowledge, skills” and associated physical objects used
by “communities, groups, and . . . individuals” as a part of their cul-
tural identity.9 The convention notes that intangible cultural heritage
is transient in that it “is constantly recreated by communities and
groups.”10 The convention places indigenous peoples at the center of
its concern, expressly stating “that communities, in particular indige-
nous communities . . . play an important role in the production,
safeguarding, maintenance and re-creation of the intangible cul-
tural heritage.”11
For the present analysis, discussion will be streamlined by hav-
ing the term “practice” used as a collective reference to the intangible
cultural heritage covered by CSICH Article 2’s “practices, represen-
tations, expressions, knowledge, skills” and associated physical ob-
jects.12 In addition, when discussing indigenous peoples, the analysis
will use “communities” and “groups” interchangeably to reference the
Article 2’s “communities and groups,” such that “indigenous commu-
nity” and “indigenous group” share the same meaning of a collective
of indigenous people who self-identify as sharing a common identity
and culture.13 Furthermore, in discussing the intangible cultural heri-
tage of indigenous peoples, the discussion follows Article 2 in inter-
preting intangible cultural heritage as a practice done by either groups
or individuals, with indigenous individuals having the same capac-
ity as indigenous groups to create and express indigenous culture.14
While it may appear comprehensive, the CSICH circumscribes
itself in two ways. First, it constrains itself under the international
human rights system, stressing that it covers intangible cultural
heritage only to the extent that it “is compatible with existing in-
ternational human rights instruments.”15 Second, while the conven-
tion seeks the protection of intangible cultural heritage to serve a
“general interest to humanity,”16 it does not claim humanity in
7. CSICH, supra note 1, pmbl.
8. Id. art. 1.
9. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1.
10. Id.
11. Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
12. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1.
13. CSICH, supra note 1, art. 2, ¶ 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.; Lucas Lixinski, Selecting Heritage: The Interplay of Art, Politics and Identity,
22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 81, 84 (2011).
16. CSICH, supra note 1, art. 19, ¶ 2.
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general has an interest in a particular culture’s heritage.17 Rather,
it asserts that humanity’s interest is in the protection of all local—
including indigenous—cultures and the collective forms of heritage
associated with each one,18 with the understanding that both a cul-
ture and its cultural practices are worthy of protection.19 Attendant
with such understanding is a recognition that a particular expression
of culture constituting indigenous heritage still belongs to the indige-
nous group responsible for it.20 The valuation of cultural heritage
under the CSICH does not follow an “objective” standard in terms
of being evaluated by all humanity but instead follows a “subjective”
standard in terms of being evaluated by the indigenous group that
creates and practices such heritage.21
In terms of implementation, the convention requests perfor-
mance by parties at both international and national levels.22 At the
international level, it charges parties with international cooperation
in the form of “the exchange of information and experience, joint
initiatives” and a financial mechanism to help parties safeguard in-
tangible cultural heritage.23 The convention also calls upon state
parties to maintain a “Representative List of the Intangible Cultural
Heritage of Humanity” and a “List of Intangible Cultural Heritage
in Need of Urgent Safeguarding.”24
At the national level, implementation calls upon each state party
to “take the necessary measures to ensure the safeguarding of the
intangible cultural heritage present in its territory.”25 This includes
promoting, protecting, studying, and enabling access to intangible
cultural heritage;26 educating the general public and local communi-
ties about the content and conditions of intangible cultural heritage;27
and mirroring the international lists of intangible cultural heritage
by compiling “inventories,” with each state party maintaining a list
of intangible cultural heritage within its borders.28
Ostensibly, the CSICH asserts that state parties “shall endeavor
to ensure the widest possible participation of communities, groups
17. Lixinski, supra note 15, at 95.
18. See id.
19. See Michael F. Brown, Heritage Trouble: Recent Work on the Protection of Intangible
Cultural Property, 12 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 40, 47 (2005).
20. JANET BLAKE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO 2003 CONVENTION ON THE SAFE-
GUARDING OF THE INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE 35 (2006).
21. Lenzerini, supra note 6, at 108.
22. CSICH, supra note 1, pmbl.
23. Id. arts. 19, ¶ 1, 25.
24. Id. arts. 16, ¶ 1, 17, ¶ 1.
25. Id. art. 11.
26. Id. art. 13.
27. Id. art. 14.
28. CSICH, supra note 1, arts. 12, 16–17.
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and . . . individuals” in fulfilling their functions.29 The involvement of
local cultures is emphasized in a supporting resolution issued by the
convention’s state parties in 2010 calling for greater community out-
reach in awareness, education, and commercial activities.30 The resolu-
tion also declares that states “shall endeavor to ensure . . . that the
rights of the communities, groups and individuals” in relation to
their “cultural heritage are duly protected.”31 Such language sug-
gests an inclusive spirit welcoming indigenous groups within the
CSICH’s structure.
Such a reading, however, is superficial and a deeper reading of
the convention’s language shows it to be a largely state-centric in-
strument, organizationally and textually. Organizationally, it employs
a structure comprised of a General Assembly and an Intergovern-
mental Committee, both of which are comprised solely of states.32
Textually, with the wording of “shall endeavor” in Article 15, and its
supporting 2010 resolution, the CSICH does not create a legal duty
for state parties to include communities, groups, or individuals but
instead only a duty to try to do so.33 Because oversight over state
parties under the convention are held by the General Assembly and
the Intergovernmental Committee, states are essentially only account-
able to other states.34 In addition, under the language of the CSICH,
communities, groups, and individuals—indigenous or otherwise—
cannot by themselves initiate safeguarding of intangible cultural
heritage with the state nor oppose state decisions regarding intangi-
ble cultural heritage.35 While the 2010 resolution asks that state
parties obtain “free, prior and informed consent” from communities,
groups, and individuals, such a call applies only for awareness-
raising activities and creates no legal duties to do so by using wording
stating only that “all parties are encouraged” rather than required.36
Moreover, the convention specifies that state parties are the only
entities with the power to create and maintain the convention’s
national inventories and international lists of intangible cultural
29. Id. art. 15.
30. See UNESCO, General Assembly of the State Parties to the Convention for the
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage on its Third Session, ¶¶ 100–07, 116–17,
U.N. DOC. ITH/10/3.GA/CONF.201/Resolutions Rev. (June 22–24, 2010) [hereinafter G.A.
of CSICH].
31. Id. ¶ 104.
32. CSICH, supra note 1, arts. 4–5.
33. Id. art. 15; Lenzerini, supra note 6, at 111–12.
34. Francesco Bandarin, International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage: Com-
ments From UNESCO in Light of Its International Standard-Setting Instruments in the
Field of Culture, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL
AND POLICY ISSUES 316 (Christopher B. Graber et al. eds., 2012).
35. Kuruk, supra note 6, at 128.
36. G.A. of CSICH, supra note 30, ¶ 101.
286 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:281
heritage.37 The effective sum of such textual wording is that each
state party retains authority over intangible cultural heritage within
its borders and that all state parties collectively maintain dominance
over the international cultural heritage mechanisms of the conven-
tion, leaving local—including indigenous—cultures subordinate to the
power of states within the CSICH.38
Even when local cultures are included, their roles are limited un-
der the safeguarding mechanisms of the CSICH that asks states to
use “competent bodies,” “studies,” “legal, technical, administrative, and
financial measures,” and “institutions” in conjunction with experts and
representatives.39 Under the CSICH, a state party has the power to
choose which experts and representatives it will work with to fulfill
such activities, essentially granting a state control over which local
perspectives are included in safeguarding activities, and thereby al-
lowing a state to select only those experts and representatives who
conform to the preferences of the state’s political elites.40 While the
2010 resolution grants consent and control to communities over state
awareness-raising activities, states still retain control over national
inventories, international lists, and safeguarding of intangible cul-
tural heritage.41
Such a state-centric hierarchy of power creates several issues
that threaten its goals. First, the use of state-controlled national in-
ventories and international lists of intangible cultural heritage opens
threats in terms of the potential marginalization of indigenous in-
terests, in that the state can choose and classify cultural practices
for the inventories and lists in accordance with state preferences.42
Second, inventories and lists imply a desire to “preserve” culture,
with labels placed on the list taken to represent definable cultural
practices.43 But this means fixing a cultural practice and tying its
manifestation to a particular incarnation expressed at a specific
moment in time, and locking that incarnation to a particular phrase
on an inventory or list, something which scholars like Lucas Lixinski
analogize to “mummification,” and Edward Bruner equates to ar-
chiving, with the attendant implication of cultural heritage as being
“disappearing” practices known only to previous times.44 This is
37. CSICH, supra note 1, arts. 11–12; Kuruk, supra note 6, at 128; Lixinski, supra
note 15, at 82.
38. See Kuruk, supra note 6, at 128; Lixinski, supra note 15, at 82, 94.
39. See CSICH, supra note 1, art. 13; Kuruk, supra note 6, at 126–28.
40. See Lenzerini, supra note 6, at 112.
41. See G.A. of CSICH, supra note 30, ¶ 101; Lixinski, supra note 15, at 97–98.
42. See Lixinski, supra note 15, at 98–100.
43. See id. at 87–89.
44. See Edward M. Bruner, The Maasai and the Lion King: Authenticity, Nationalism,
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particularly problematic for indigenous peoples, who have historically
been subjected to representation as an exotic “other” or “primitive”
reflective of a less civilized past45 and dependent on non-indigenous
support for survival.46 Such connotations of “mummification,” archiv-
ing, practices lost to the past, and non-indigenous patronage contra-
dict the CSICH’s own assertions of intangible cultural heritage as
being transient and “constantly recreated by communities and groups”
in the present, independent of the non-indigenous world.47
The above problems lead to a third issue, in that because states
control what forms of intangible cultural heritage are placed on the
CSICH’s national inventories and international lists, it makes cul-
tural practice subject to state perceptions of indigenous peoples.48
For indigenous peoples, the placement of indigenous culture under
state interpretations of indigenous culture poses two specific problems:
(a) under the history of colonialism, states all too often employed
images that satisfied colonial perceptions of “authentic” expressions
of “primitive” societies and a subsequent normative association of
“primitive” societies being somehow inferior;49 and (b) during the
post-colonial era, states exploited indigenous culture to comply with
a nationalist narrative, adapting and modifying indigenous culture
to fulfill the state’s attempts to legitimize itself.50 As a result, state
control over indigenous culture under the CSICH echoes the histori-
cal experiences of indigenous peoples, which is rife with colonial
oppression, and the resulting legacies of imperialism that subordi-
nated indigenous peoples to non-indigenous interests.51 Such issues
have analogues in the modern era in that states can often operate
to serve the interests of elites,52 and thus, threaten to perpetuate
and Globalization in African Tourism, 28 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 881, 887, 898 (2001); Lixinski,
supra note 15, at 98.
45. See MELANIE K. SMITH, ISSUES IN CULTURAL TOURISM STUDIES 3 (2003); Siegrid
Deutschlander & Leslie J. Miller, Politicizing Aboriginal Cultural Tourism: The Discourse
of Primitivism in the Tourist Encounter, 40 CANADIAN REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 27,
30 (2003).
46. See Bruner, supra note 44, at 895.
47. CSICH, supra note 1, art. 2, ¶ 1; see also Bruner, supra note 44, at 898; Lixinski,
supra note 15, at 98.
48. Lixinski, supra note 15, at 82.
49. See Deutschlander & Miller, supra note 45, at 30, 39.
50. See Lorraine V. Aragon, Copyrighting Culture for the Nation? Intangible Property
Nationalism and the Regional Arts of Indonesia, 19 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 269, 277,
300, 304 (2012).
51. See KEN S. COATES, A GLOBAL HISTORY OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: STRUGGLE AND
SURVIVAL 18–19 (2004); LAW, HISTORY, COLONIALISM: THE REACH OF EMPIRE 1–2 (Diane
Kirkby & Catharine Coleborne eds., 2001); RECLAIMING INDIGENOUS VOICE AND VISION
xvi–xvii (Marie Battiste ed. 2000).
52. See Lenzerini, supra note 6, at 113.
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the imperialist past by continuing the historical subjugation of in-
digenous culture by non-indigenous elites.
Fourth, the act of having inventories and lists of intangible
cultural heritage risks creating a normative distinction, with prac-
tices that are listed being perceived as having greater value than
those that are not listed.53 This is problematic because the content
and meaning of inventories and lists are subject to the perceptions
and judgments of the state parties, and hence make evaluation of
indigenous cultures subject to the perspectives of non-indigenous
entities rather than the indigenous peoples responsible for creating
them.54 This contradicts the mission of the CSICH, which asserts that
state parties to the convention hold only an interest in the safe-
guarding of intangible cultural heritage, while communities, groups,
and individuals hold the actual interest in the substance of their
own culture.55
II. FRAMING THE CSICH WITHIN FOUCAULT56
The following discussion appropriates Foucault’s notions of dis-
course to provide a descriptive analysis of the CSICH and its cri-
tiques as a reflection of asymmetric power relations hosted by the
CSICH that skew power over cultural heritage in favor of states and
away from indigenous peoples.57 A Foucauldian analysis commences
with a recognition of the CSICH as a “discourse.”58 Foucault saw
“discourse[ ] . . . as practices that systematically form the objects of
which they speak.”59 Discourse can be speech, writing, acts, or symbols
that generate frameworks within which people interact.60 Within a
53. Id. at 110.
54. See id. at 111–13.
55. See BLAKE, supra note 20, at 35; Lixinski, supra note 15, at 95.
56. The following section draws heavily from the author’s previous works, entitled
“Human Safaris: A Foucauldian Alternative to the Law’s Treatment of the Indigenous
Andaman Jarawa” and “Using Foucault to Construct Normative Guidelines for an Ethics
of Tourist-Indigenous Encounters.” See Jonathan Liljeblad, Human Safaris: A Foucauldian
Alternative to the Law’s Treatment of the Indigenous Andaman Jarawa, 18 AUST. IN-
DIGENOUS L. REV. 6 (2014/2015) [hereinafter Liljeblad, Human Safaris]; Jonathan Liljeblad,
Using Foucault to Construct Normative Guidelines for an Ethics of Tourist-Indigenous
Encounters, 15 TOURIST STUD. 65 (2015) [hereinafter Liljeblad, Using Foucault].
57. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: AND THE
DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE (Alan M. Sheridan trans., 1972).
58. See id. at 49; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 10; Liljeblad,
Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 69.
59. FOUCAULT, supra note 57, at 49; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note
56, at 10.
60. ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF
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discourse, Foucault sees “discursive formation[s],” which are the stable
elements at the center of discourse61 that reflect an “episteme,” which
is a world-view comprised of postulates and modes of reason.62
Through these components, a discourse forms a structure control-
ling the flow of information and meanings between people.63
From such a perspective, the CSICH can be seen as a Foucauldian
discourse in that it creates an international legal and policy frame-
work for a systematic practice of verbal, written, physical, and sym-
bolic actions between people regarding intangible cultural heritage.64
It provides discursive formations, since it asserts a collection of stable
elements by setting a common understanding of concepts that are
to be shared between state parties, such as “inventories,” “lists,” “safe-
guarding” activities, “local” communities, “experts,” and “intangible
cultural heritage” itself.65 These elements reflect an episteme in that
they imply a world-view that sees “intangible cultural heritage” as
“practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills” that can
be identified, listed, and sustained through the actions of nation-
states.66 As a result, the CSICH acts to structure a way of thinking
and discussing intangible cultural heritage on a global scale, with
the nature of information and meanings about intangible cultural
heritage being directed through the vocabulary and mechanisms
specified by the convention to all of its state parties.67
For Foucault, understanding a discourse is important because
its structure is a means of inclusion and exclusion towards actors
and ideas and thereby is determinative in the distribution of power.68
Hence, the control of knowledge reflects power relations, such “that
power and knowledge directly imply one another.”69 By controlling
LAW AS GOVERNANCE 8 (1994); see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 10;
Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 69.
61. FOUCAULT, supra note 57, at 38; HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 60, at 9; see also
Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 10.
62. FOUCAULT, supra note 57, at 191; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note
56, at 10.
63. See HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 60, at 8; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris,
supra note 56, at 10.
64. See HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 60, at 8; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris,
supra note 56, at 10; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 69.
65. See HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 60, at 9; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris,
supra note 56, at 10. See generally CSICH, supra note 1.
66. See CSICH, supra note 1, art. 2, ¶ 1; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra
note 56, at 10.
67. See also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 10.
68. See HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 60, at 8–9. See also Liljeblad, Human Safaris,
supra note 56, at 10; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 69.
69. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 27 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977); HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 60, at 12–13.
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who and what is involved in the communication of information and
meaning, a discourse circumscribes the potential outcomes and so
directs the resulting actions a discourse may produce.70 In this way,
a discourse connects power, knowledge, and reality.
Foucault’s concerns regarding discourse, exclusion, power, knowl-
edge, and reality lie at the core of the critiques leveled against the
CSICH. The charges of critics largely focus on the CSICH’s state-
centric structure, which they see as granting state parties with a
hegemonic share of power over the local communities who actually
create their own intangible cultural heritage.71 In the decision-making
mechanisms of the General Assembly and the Intergovernmental
Committee, state parties are included but non-state actors are ex-
cluded.72 In the safeguarding duties of the convention, state parties
control the national inventories, international lists, competent bodies,
studies, and institutions, while the role of local communities—includ-
ing indigenous groups—as creators and bearers of intangible cul-
tural heritage is subordinated and marginalized.73 The result is that
states hold a position of primacy in a hierarchy of power over indige-
nous peoples in determining what is identified as intangible cultural
property and how it is treated under the convention.74
For indigenous peoples, this situation does little to address the
historical power inequalities that subordinated them to colonial im-
perialism.75 If anything, it maintains the substance of colonial domina-
tion, in that it continues to make control over their own cultural
heritage subject to the authority of non-indigenous sovereigns.76 In
Foucauldian terms, under the CSICH, they are subordinated within
a discourse over their own cultural heritage.77 While the CSICH
calls for their inclusion, its language is discretionary for state par-
ties and hence still endows states with the authority to determine
the fate of practices, ideas, and meanings about cultural heritage
under the convention.78 This effectively excludes indigenous peoples
from decisions about their own culture, and thus makes the present
fate of indigenous culture a continuation of their experiences under
the asymmetric power structures of the colonial past.
70. See HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 60, at 8–9; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris,
supra note 56, at 10; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 69.
71. Kuruk, supra note 6, at 128.
72. See CSICH, supra note 1, arts. 4–5.
73. See id. arts. 12–13, 16–17.
74. See Lenzerini, supra note 6, at 112.
75. COATES, supra note 51, at 18–19.
76. Kuruk, supra note 6, at 128.
77. HUNT & WICKHAM, supra note 60, at 8–9.
78. CSICH, supra note 1, art. 15; Lenzerini, supra note 6, at 111–12.
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Foucault, however, provides ways to address these issues with
a number of additional concepts that allow several options to miti-
gate the power imbalances under the CSICH. In particular, for this
analysis, Foucault’s concepts of “archaeology,” “genealogy,” “technol-
ogies of power,” “technologies of the self,” and “micropolitics” of dis-
course in power relations are relevant.79 Foucault describes power
as composed of interactions that occur within networks of relation-
ships between actors exercising technologies of power and technolo-
gies of the self.80 Dominant actors maintain their hegemonic status
through technologies of power, which are processes of measurement
and categorization that define the identities of other actors as ob-
jects subject to power.81 Against technologies of power, subordinate
actors use technologies of the self to control their own identities and
thereby counter domination.82 Foucault refers to the interactions
between technologies of power and technologies of the self as the
micropolitics that characterize the power relations in a discourse.83
To the extent that there can be multiple actors, multiple technolo-
gies of power, and multiple technologies of the self, the idea of mi-
cropolitics encompasses pluralist forms of power.84 To understand
micropolitics, Foucault applies the terms of archeology and geneal-
ogy.85 Archaeology refers to the production of knowledge via struc-
ture and rules of discourse that set “the prohibitions, exclusions,
limitations, values, fiefdoms, and transgressions” of discursive prac-
tice.86 For Foucault, practices of exclusion and limitation control the
sources and expressions of concepts and theories that form knowl-
edge.87 Genealogy works alongside archaeology by exploring how
79. STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRITICAL INTERROGA-
TIONS 54–56 (1991); Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self, in TECHNOLOGIES OF THE
SELF: A SEMINAR WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT 18 (Luther H. Martin et al. eds., 1988); see also
Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 10; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56,
at 70.
80. Foucault, supra note 79, at 18; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56,
at 10; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 70.
81. See Foucault, supra note 79, at 18; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note
56, at 10; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 70.
82. See Foucault, supra note 79, at 18; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note
56, at 10; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 70.
83. See BEST & KELLNER, supra note 79, at 56; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris,
supra note 56, at 10; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 70.
84. See BEST & KELLNER, supra note 79, at 56; see also Liljeblad, Using Foucault,
supra note 56, at 70.
85. See BEST & KELLNER, supra note 79, at 54–56; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris,
supra note 56, at 10; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 70.
86. FOUCAULT, supra note 57, at 193; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note
56, at 10; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 70.
87. FOUCAULT, supra note 57, at 193, 195; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra
note 56, at 10–11; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 70.
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discourse uses knowledge to define norms and identities, and thereby
serving to turn knowledge into power over actors whose conduct is
determined by noms and identities.88
Under these concepts, the discourse over intangible cultural
heritage in regards to the CSICH can be seen as being constituted
by interactions within a network of state parties, with interactions
occurring among state parties, as well as between each state party
and the local communities, groups, and individuals within its terri-
tory.89 State parties to the CSICH hold technologies of power in that
they are given authority over processes of measurement in terms of
the convention asking them to employ “studies” and “legal, techni-
cal, administrative and financial measures,”90 as well as categoriza-
tion in terms of the convention granting them discretionary control
to decide what cultural expressions are to be placed on national
inventories and international lists of intangible cultural heritage.91
In contrast, indigenous groups under the CSICH hold technologies
of the self in the form of their disparate expressions of their respec-
tive identities—that is, each indigenous group holds technologies of
the self through its status as the creator and bearer of its own
unique intangible cultural heritage lived through the group’s “prac-
tices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills,” and associ-
ated physical objects.92
The micropolitics between these technologies of power and
technologies of the self are structured by the articles of the CSICH.93
Under the CSICH, the archaeology of discourse encompasses objects
in the form of state parties, local communities, groups, and individu-
als that are the sources of ideas and meanings regarding intangible
cultural heritage.94 The dominant position of state parties gives
them the capacity to limit and exclude indigenous peoples, with the
former holding more power relative to the latter in controlling and
administering what constitutes “intangible cultural heritage.”95 This
88. See BEST & KELLNER, supra note 79, at 57–58; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris,
supra note 56, at 11; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 70–71.
89. See supra notes 54–78 and accompanying text; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris,
supra note 56, at 11; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 71 (applying similar
Foucauldian concepts to other indigenous rights issues).
90. See CSICH, supra note 1, art. 13.
91. See id. arts. 12, 16.
92. See id. art. 2, ¶¶ 1–2.
93. See id. arts. 2, 11–13, 15–16; supra notes 70–80 and accompanying text; see also
Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 11; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56,
at 71.
94. See supra notes 70–80 and accompanying text; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris,
supra note 56, at 11; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 71.
95. See supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text; compare CSICH, supra note 1, art.
11, with CSICH, supra note 1, art. 15.
2020] A CRITICAL COMMENT ON POWER AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 293
creates a genealogy of discourse wherein state parties hold a hege-
monic status in a discourse politics that makes a normative determi-
nation about which cultures and which manifestations of culture are
entitled to receive state “safeguarding” measures and status on a
national inventory or international list—and which ones are not.96
III. USING FOUCAULT TO IDENTIFY INDIGENOUS
STRATEGIES FOR THE CSICH97
The previous section conducted a descriptive analysis that used
Foucault to frame the CSICH and its critiques within Foucault’s
concepts of discourse and power, focusing on the asymmetric power
relations under the CSICH that skew power over cultural heritage
in favor of states and away from indigenous peoples. The present
section performs a prescriptive analysis that uses Foucault to high-
light the elements driving the power inequalities of the CSICH and,
from such insights, identifies the types of strategies that are appro-
priate to alter the convention in ways that are more favorable to
indigenous control over indigenous cultural heritage.
Foucault does not see the relations between power, knowledge,
and reality as being inevitable, in that they are a product of history
that “can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they were
made.”98 Further, Foucault does not see discourse as always predis-
posed to hegemonic power, with discourse also providing a “point of
resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy,” allowing
for counter-discourses by marginal actors against dominant ones.99
Marginal actors can work through technologies of self “to effect by
their own means or with the help of others a certain number of
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and
way of being, so as to transform themselves” in ways contrary to the
efforts of technologies of power wielded by dominant actors.100
96. See Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 11; Liljeblad, Using Foucault,
supra note 56, at 71.
97. The following section again draws heavily from the author’s previous works,
entitled “Human Safaris: A Foucauldian Alternative to the Law’s Treatment of the
Indigenous Andaman Jarawa,” and “Using Foucault to Construct Normative Guidelines
for an Ethics of Tourist-Indigenous Encounters.” See Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra
note 56; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56.
98. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Critical Theory/Intellectual History, in POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY,
CULTURE: INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITING: 1977–1984 17, 37 (Lawrence D. Kritzman
ed., 1988); see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 11; Liljeblad, Using
Foucault, supra note 56, at 71.
99. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 101 (Robert Hurley trans., 1990);
see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 11; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra
note 56, at 71.
100. Foucault, supra note 79, at 18; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56,
at 11; Liljeblad, Using Foucault, supra note 56, at 71–72.
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Expectations for resistance and counter-discourses, however,
rely on an assumption that there are technologies of the self that
are able to operate against technologies of power.101 With respect to
the CSICH, this means that there must be mechanisms through
which indigenous peoples are able to influence the discourse over
their intangible cultural heritage against states. Under the CSICH,
however, such mechanisms are limited. While the convention asks
that states “shall endeavour to ensure the widest possible participa-
tion of [local] communities, groups and . . . individuals” and hence
appears to provide for a technology of the self, this is only a cursory
concession of power because the language does not require states to
guarantee participation.102 Instead, it only requires that they “en-
deavour” to do so, and thus in reality, it operates as a technology of
power that maintains the hegemony of states.103
It is possible that, as the creators and bearers of their own cul-
ture, indigenous peoples by definition hold technologies of the self,
in that they already perform the “operations on their own bodies
and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being” that constitute their
own intangible cultural heritage.104 Unfortunately, under the state-
centric power structure created by the CSICH, such technologies of
the self offer little power since it’s the states who hold authority
over the categorization of indigenous “operations,” “thoughts,” “con-
duct,” or “way of being” on the national inventories, international
lists, and safeguarding mechanisms contained within the CSICH.105
It is important, however, to focus on the relative capabilities of
technologies of the self vis-à-vis technologies of power. Specifically,
it is not enough that there are technologies of the self.106 In order to
generate resistance sufficient to promote counter-discourses against
hegemonic actors, it is necessary to have “(1) technologies of the self
that are effective in terms of being sufficient to counter technologies
of power; and (2) technologies of the self counter technologies of
power with respect to both creation and use of Indigenous culture.”107
Mere presence in a discourse or simple options to express concerns
is insufficient to counter technologies of power over creation or use
of culture, and constitutes instead a form of token participation that
101. See also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 11.
102. CSICH, supra note 1, art. 15.
103. See id.
104. FOUCAULT, supra note 57, at 18; see also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note
56, at 12.
105. CSICH, supra note 1, Parts III–IV; Foucault, supra note 79, at 18.
106. See also Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 12; Liljeblad, Using Foucault,
supra note 56, at 72.
107. See Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 12.
2020] A CRITICAL COMMENT ON POWER AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 295
limits marginalized voices to representation rather than participa-
tion.108 Without the empowerment of agency to control the presenta-
tion of their own culture, indigenous people will continue to be
vulnerable to neocolonial patterns of marginalization wherein non-
indigenous interests hold ultimate authority over the treatment of
indigenous identities.109
To the extent that cultural heritage is a component of identity,
this means a call to move the CSICH away from a state-centric power
structure through alteration of the convention text that will explic-
itly grant creators and bearers of intangible cultural heritage the
power to decide what aspects of themselves fall under the CSICH and
what actions should be taken towards those aspects.110 This suggests
the granting of power equal to, if not greater than, state parties for
indigenous peoples with respect to decisions related to their own
intangible cultural heritage. This means going beyond conceptual-
ization of the convention as recognizing that each indigenous group
holds an interest in its own culture; and instead altering the conven-
tion to allow each indigenous group enough power to counter the
actions of states in decisions regarding the group’s culture.111 Within
the decision-making structure created by the CSICH, this suggests
that each indigenous group should have representation in the General
Assembly and Intergovernmental Committee that is of comparable
status to state parties, as well as participation in safeguarding
mechanisms that is of comparable status to state parties—at least
for decisions affecting the group’s own intangible cultural heritage.112
Such changes would effectively mean greater self-determination
within a nation-state system. Such changes would also be consistent
with scholars like John Paquette, Bruce Robbins, and Elsa
Stamatopoulou, who argue that indigenous rights to culture are a
component of the struggle for indigenous self-determination.113 Calls
for indigenous self-determination, however, should not necessarily
be interpreted as a challenge to state sovereignty, in that it is possi-
ble to enable indigenous self-determination without threatening the
territorial integrity of state parties.114 Here, for example, the scope
108. See also id.
109. See also id.
110. Elena Franchi, What is Cultural Heritage?, SMARTHISTORY (Aug. 8, 2015), https://
smarthistory.org/what-is-cultural-heritage [http://perma.cc/S8UM-HXHH].
111. See BLAKE, supra note 20, at 34–36.
112. See CSICH, supra note 1, arts. 4–5, 11.
113. See Jonathan Paquette, From Decolonization to Postcolonial Management:
Challenging Heritage Administration and Governance in New Zealand, 12 PUB. ORG.
REV. 127, 128 (2012); Bruce Robbins & Elsa Stamatopoulou, Reflections on Culture and
Cultural Rights, 103 S. ATLANTIC Q. 419, 426–27 (2004).
114. See Robbins & Stamatopoulou, supra note 113, at 426, 428–30.
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of proposed changes is limited, in that they are narrowly targeted
to the issue of intangible cultural heritage within the confines of the
CSICH and so do not relate to the power of nation-states for issues
outside of indigenous culture within their respective borders. In ad-
dition, the impact of these changes are mitigated by their confined
focus on empowering an indigenous group with power sufficient to
counter the hegemonic status of states on decisions related to the
group’s own intangible cultural heritage, and so do not call for either
the complete evisceration of state power under the convention or the
integration of all indigenous peoples into all decisions regarding
cultural heritage within the convention.115
It should be noted that because Foucault saw discourses as fluid
and malleable he also saw the identities at the center of discourses
as being fluid and malleable.116 This suggests that reflections of
identity like cultural heritage are transient. While this makes
Foucault consistent with the CSICH’s recognition that “intangible
cultural heritage . . . is constantly recreated,” it also leads to an
additional call for adjustments to the convention: the nature of the
convention’s inventories and lists need to change.117 The CSICH’s
inventories and lists operate as mechanisms of “mummification” and
“archiving” that “fix” culture to specific manifestations in time, making
them inconsistent with Foucauldian notions of transient identities.118
As a result, to fully conform to Foucault, the CSICH’s conception of
inventories and lists must be altered to allow greater dynamism in
the intangible cultural heritage identified within them—and in a way
that observes the above call to grant greater power to the creators
and bearers of intangible cultural heritage.119
An example of how this could be achieved would be to allow
intangible cultural expressions to be added and removed from the
inventories and lists as their practices and meanings change in
importance to the people and places of their origin. This would be
consistent with Foucault so long as indigenous peoples made decisions
about which of their own cultural practices were important enough to
warrant inclusion and which ones had lost enough importance to war-
rant removal.120 An alternative example, suggested by Federico
Lenzerini, would be to treat each manifestation of culture on the
CSICH’s inventories and lists as fluid and subject to change as their
115. See generally CSICH, supra note 1.
116. See FOUCAULT, supra note 57, at 48–49, 208–09.
117. See CSICH, supra note 1, art. 2, ¶ 1.
118. Compare supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text, with BLAKE, supra note 20,
at 35.
119. See CSICH, supra note 1, arts. 12, 16–17.
120. See supra notes 62–84 and accompanying text.
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cultures of origin changed.121 This would suggest that while the name
of some specific intangible cultural heritage on the CSICH’s invento-
ries and lists would stay constant, the manifestation of culture rep-
resented by that name would evolve in accordance with the changes
in the communities, groups, and individuals comprising that cul-
ture.122 The challenge with this is that it would raise questions as to
the function of the CSICH’s inventories and lists—specifically,
whether they are meant to be catalogs of names that represent par-
ticular permutations of culture at specific moments and places in
time, or if they are meant to be catalogs of names that represent
spaces for culture to live and change.
There is an additional area of concern regarding the CSICH
associated with its treatment of non-state entities: the convention
ostensibly encompasses “communities,” “groups,” and “individuals”,
but, in doing so, it seems to miss recognizing that collectives like “com-
munities” or “groups” are themselves composed of individuals.123 This
is an issue because the CSICH ties itself to the international human
rights system,124 and the international human rights system sees
tensions between group rights and individual rights.125 This means
that the issues regarding the power structure of the CSICH go beyond
questions about the power relations between state parties and com-
munities or groups but also include questions about the power
relations between communities or groups and the individuals that
comprise their collectives. This calls for an extension of Foucauldian
analysis to address the power relations within indigenous groups,
particularly in terms of the relations between a particular indigenous
group and its individual members.
Foucault, in focusing on the interactions comprising social net-
works between people, conceives of power and discourses of power
as being defined by the relations between individuals.126 Foucault
would see a micropolitics of discourse within each indigenous group,
with archeology identifying the objects of discourse as being each of
121. Lenzerini, supra note 6, at 108–09.
122. See id.
123. See CSICH, supra note 1, pmbl.
124. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1.
125. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 218 (2d
ed. 2003); MICHAEL FREEMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS 68–71 (Polity Press ed., 2002); WILL
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 34–35
(1995); Richard A. Wilson, Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, CULTURE AND CONTEXT 1, 1–4, 6 (1997); Michael K. Addo, Practice of United
Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies in the Reconciliation of Cultural Diversity with
Universal Respect for Human Rights, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 601, 601 (2010); Lynn Meskell,
Human Rights and Heritage Ethics, 83 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 839, 839–40 (2010).
126. Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTUR-
ALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208, 217 (2d ed. 1983).
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the group’s members, where each person is a source of practices, ideas,
and meanings regarding intangible cultural heritage.127 Foucault
would see a resulting genealogy with some fraction members hold-
ing technologies of power that allowed them to maintain a position
of dominance over others in their group.128
The CSICH’s ties to the international human rights system
would lead Foucault to look upon such power disparities between
individuals with some concern.129 While there have been steps by
the United Nations to recognize group culture,130 one of the core
elements of the international human rights system,131 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), phrases group
rights as a function of rights held by individuals, stating that “per-
sons . . . shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture.”132 While the
Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR has commented that this
should be implemented with the understanding that individual rights
“turn on the ability of the . . . group to maintain its culture,”133 it has
also stated that “States parties have . . . undertaken to ensure the
enjoyment of these rights to all individuals under their jurisdiction.
This aspect calls for specific activities by the States . . . to enable
individuals to enjoy their rights.”134 Under the ICCPR, such rights
include a “right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion” and
a “right to hold opinions without interference,” which would imply
inclusion of thoughts and opinions about culture and hence intangi-
ble cultural heritage expressing such culture.135 As a result, the
CSICH would be required by the international human rights system
to be concerned with the rights of all individuals within each indige-
nous group in its discourse over intangible cultural heritage.
127. See BEST & KELLNER, supra note 79, at 54–59; see also supra notes 73–78 and
accompanying text.
128. See BEST & KELLNER, supra note 79, at 57; Foucault, supra note 79, at 18; see also
Liljeblad, Human Safaris, supra note 56, at 13–14.
129. See CSICH, supra note 1, arts. 2–3.
130. Elsa Stamatopoulou, Monitoring Cultural Human Rights: The Claims of Culture
on Human Rights and the Response of Cultural Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1170, 1170–71,
1176–79 (2012).
131. Human Rights Bodies—Complaints Procedures, OHCHR (2013), http://www.oh
chr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx [http://perma.cc/7N8G
-GYYF] [hereinafter Complaint Procedures]; Monitoring the Core International Human
Rights Treaties, OHCHR (2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/Overview
.aspx [http://perma.cc/NHF3-QY DK].
132. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976; adopted by the United States,
September 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
133. Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 40, U.N. DOC. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994).
134. Id. at 4.
135. See ICCPR, supra note 132, arts. 18, ¶ 1, 19, ¶ 1.
2020] A CRITICAL COMMENT ON POWER AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 299
Foucault would interpret this as a call to address the power
inequalities in discourse via a search for technologies of the self that
would enable each of the individuals within an indigenous group to
participate in their collective discourse over culture to the extent
that it influences their respective individual identities.136 This directs
attention away from strategies that seek state intervention in the
group to ensure individual rights137 since doing so would effectively
be an expansion of state technologies of power within the power
structure of the CSICH.138 Rather, it directs attention towards strate-
gies that favor individual self-empowerment over state power.139
Extending the logic of previous discussion that took Foucault’s tech-
nologies of the self as a pointer to solutions involving greater inte-
gration of indigenous groups into the decision-making bodies of the
CSICH,140 this means that some form of representation within the
convention’s General Assembly, Intergovernmental Committee, and
safeguarding mechanisms must be allowed for indigenous individu-
als in a manner that empowers them to express their own personal
views even if they run contrary to the preferences of those in
power—whether that power be held by states or others in their own
indigenous group.
While practical considerations may make it difficult to open the
institutions and mechanisms of the CSICH to all individuals claim-
ing to be creators and bearers of intangible cultural heritage, it may
be possible to amend the CSICH to become more accessible to indi-
viduals marginalized from their own intangible cultural heritage.
For example, the CSICH could be supplemented with a complaint
mechanism for individuals enabling them with a means of pursuing
relief for actions taken by the General Assembly, Intergovernmental
Committee, or safeguarding mechanisms that excluded them from
decisions regarding their own intangible cultural heritage. The
structure of the CSICH places communities, groups, and individuals
at the same common status relative to state parties, suggesting that
whatever changes to the convention grant more power to communi-
ties and groups should similarly be extended to do so for individuals.
This is not out of the realm of possibility, because a precedent exists
for individual complaint mechanisms within the international
human rights system, with several of the human rights treaties that
136. See, e.g., BEST & KELLNER, supra note 79, at 54–68.
137. BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICUL-
TURALISM 146–54 (Polity Press ed., 2001).
138. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
139. See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 125.
140. See supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text.
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comprise the international human rights system—including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—providing
treaty bodies that can receive communications from individuals.141
Such a change to the CSICH is possible, because the CSICH has a
provision specifying amendment procedures to the convention.142
CONCLUSION
The findings of this analysis regarding discourse and power
within the CSICH revolve around the tensions within the CSICH
between state parties and indigenous peoples. The theme that results
can be described as one of structure versus agency: the CSICH can be
described as supporting a power structure that provides state par-
ties with dominant authority over indigenous peoples with respect
to indigenous intangible cultural heritage.143 Foucault highlights the
reason for this by detailing how something like the CSICH provides
indigenous peoples with insufficient technologies of the self to
counter the hegemonic position of state parties.144 Foucault would
point to this as driving the suppression of agency by indigenous
peoples within the decision-making structure created by the conven-
tion, and the factor that allows them to be marginalized in the dis-
course over their own heritage.
The relation of Foucault’s ideas to the description of the CSICH
provide prescriptive value, because they direct anyone concerned
with the power inequalities of the convention to look for solutions in
the form of technologies of the self that are sufficient to enable margin-
alized entities to control their own identities.145 Under Foucault, it
is through technologies of the self that subordinated voices will be able
to alter the power relations in discourse from one of domination to one
of dialectic, with marginalized actors being able to use them to become
active agents operating autonomously against hegemonic power.146
This analysis follows such reasoning to call for the installation
of technologies of the self within the CSICH—specifically, calling for
providing each indigenous group with effective technologies of the
self that are sufficient to counter the technologies of power held by
state parties with respect to the creation and use of that group’s own
intangible cultural heritage.147 Such technologies take the form of
141. See Complaint Procedures, supra note 131.
142. CSICH, supra note 1, art. 38.
143. CSICH, supra note 1, arts. 11, 15.
144. See supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text.
145. See BEST & KELLNER, supra note 79, at 64–65.
146. See id.
147. See supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text.
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changes to the CSICH that integrate indigenous peoples more fully
into the decision-making structure of the convention, such that they
are given greater agency in the discourse over the treatment of their
own intangible cultural heritage. In doing so, this Article parallels
the works of scholars like John Paquette, Bruce Robbins, and Elsa
Stamatopoulou, who see indigenous rights to culture as a component
of indigenous self-determination.148 By calling for changes to the
CSICH that allow indigenous peoples authority comparable to the con-
vention’s state parties, this analysis effectively seeks to foster greater
indigenous self-determination with respect to indigenous culture.
The need for greater agency is one shared with indigenous
scholars such as Alexis Bunten, Doreen Martinez, and, to an extent,
Amanda Stronza, who in their studies of indigenous tourism high-
light the need for greater agency by indigenous peoples within the
structure of their relations with a non-indigenous world.149 The distinc-
tion, however, between this study and other indigenous scholars is
that this study finds the idea of agency under the CSICH should not
just be associated with indigenous groups as monolithic entities but
should also be extended to cover individual members within the
indigenous groups themselves.150 As a result, this discussion follows
Foucault to a logical extension involving a more expansive, deeper
call regarding agency relative to other indigenous scholarship.
Doing so is consistent with the CSICH, both in terms of its lan-
guage and its connection to the international human rights system.151
Its language is inclusive of communities, groups, and individuals,
and so by intent and design encompasses indigenous groups and
their individual members.152 In addition, by constraining itself under
the international human rights system, the convention places itself
under a requirement to observe the human rights of both groups
and individuals with respect to intangible cultural heritage.
148. Paquette, supra note 113, at 128; Robbins & Stamatopoulou, supra note 113, at
426–27.
149. Alexis C. Bunten, More Like Ourselves: Indigenous Capitalism Through Tourism,
34 AM. INDIAN Q. 285, 304–06 (2010); Doreen Martinez, Wrong Directions and New Maps
of Voice, Representation, and Engagement: Theorizing Cultural Tourism, Indigenous
Commodities, and the Intelligence of Participation, 36 AM. INDIAN Q. 545, 546–47 (2012);
Amanda Stronza, Anthropology of Tourism: Forging New Ground for EcoTourism and
Other Alternatives, 30 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 261, 268, 277–78 (2001).
150. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
151. See CSICH, supra note 1, pmbl., arts. 2–3.
152. See id. pmbl., arts. 1, 15.
